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The Vietnam War: The Home Front
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Is it true, as some have argued, that the United States failed to prevent a communist takeover in South Vietnam not because its military was defeated on the battlefield but because of problems at home, in both the United States and South Vietnam?
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Use the sources and your knowledge of the period 1961–68 to assess the validity of the preceding question. Be sure to discuss not only the political, economic, or social problems on the home front but also military strategy and tactics.
Primary source: "The War in Vietnam and Indochina, 1964–75," map.
Background information: This map shows U.S. military bases in Indochina, and the major troop and supply lines of South and of North Vietnam.
Map from Alan Brinkley, American History: A Survey, 10th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill College, 1999), 1051.
Courtesy of McGraw-Hill.
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Primary source: Buddhist monks protest, photo, 1963.
Background information: Buddhist monks set themselves on fire to protest against the government of Ngo Dinh Diem (1901–63), president of South Vietnam, whose policies, they charged, favored Roman Catholics over Buddhists. It was an extreme measure that horrified the American public.
AP / Wide World Photos
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Primary source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, memorandum to Robert S. McNamara, secretary of defense, 1964.
Background information: On behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor, the chairman, wrote this memorandum to Robert S. McNamara (b. 1916), secretary of defense, in 1964.
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. . .It is our conviction that if support of the insurgency from outside South Vietnam in terms of operational direction, personnel, and material were stopped completely, the character of the war in South Vietnam would be substantially and favorably altered. Because of this conviction, we are wholly in favor of executing the covert actions against North Vietnam which you have recently proposed to the President....
. . .Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the
United States must make ready to conduct increasingly bolder
actions in Southeast Asia....
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Maxwell D. Taylor for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, memorandum to the secretary of defense (22 January 1964), reprinted in The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam, Senator Gravel ed. (Boston: Beacon, 1971), 3:496–99.
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Primary source: President Johnson, "Peace Without Conquest," speech, 1965.
Background information: The Gulf of Tonkin incident fueled the growing debate among Americans about the nation's involvement in the Vietnam War. In this speech, President Johnson (1908–73) explained his position.
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We do this in order to slow down aggression. We do this to increase the confidence of the brave people of South Vietnam who have bravely borne this brutal battle for so many years and with so many casualties.
And we do this to convince the leaders of North Vietnam, and all who seek to share their conquest, of a very simple fact:
We will not be defeated.
We will not grow tired.
We will not withdraw, either openly or under
the cloak of a meaningless
agreement....
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Lyndon B. Johnson, speech, U.S. Department of State Bulletin 52 (26 April 1965):607.
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Primary source: George Ball, "A Compromise Solution in South Vietnam," memorandum to President Johnson, 1965.
Background information: In this memorandum to President Johnson (1908–73), George Ball (1909–94), undersecretary of state, discusses the role of the U.S. military in South Vietnam.
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. . . A Losing War: The South Vietnamese is losing the war to the Viet Cong. No one can assure you that we can beat the Viet Cong or even force them to the conference table on our terms, no matter how many hundred thousand white, foreign (U.S.) troops we deploy.
[ . . . ]
Once we suffer large casualties, we will have started a well-nigh irreversible process. Our involvement will be so great that we cannot—without national humiliation—stop short of achieving our complete objectives. Of the two possibilities I think humiliation would be more likely than the achievement of our objectives—even after we have paid terrible costs.
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George Ball, "A Compromise Solution in South Vietnam," memorandum to the president (1 July 1965), reprinted in The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam, Senator Gravel ed. (Boston: Beacon, 1971), 4:615–19.
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Primary source: Robert S. McNamara, "Recommendations of Additional Deployments to Vietnam," memorandum to President Johnson, 1965.
Background information: In this memorandum to President Johnson (1908–73), Robert S. McNamara (b. 1916), secretary of defense, recommends a course of action he believes will achieve "the best odds [and] the best outcome."
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[ . . . ]
. . . There are now 15 US (and 1 Australian) combat battalions in VN [Vietnam]; they together with other combat and non-combat personnel, bring the total US personnel in VN to approx. 15,000.
a. Increase by October to 34 maneuver battalions; plus other reinforcements, up to approx. 175,000.... It should be understood that the deployment of more men (perhaps 100,000) may be necessary in early 1966, and that the deployment of additional forces therefore is possible but will depend on developments. (Ask Congress to authorize call up of 235,000 men in Reserve and National Guard; increase regular forces by 375,000 men. By mid-66 [1966] US would have 600,000 additional men as protection against contingencies.)
[ . . . ]
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Robert McNamara, "Recommendations of Additional Deployments
to Vietnam," memorandum to the president (20 July 1965), reprinted in
The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United
States Decisionmaking on Vietnam, Senator Gravel ed. (Boston:
Beacon, 1971), 4:619–22, and reproduced at http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon4/doc261.htm.
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Primary source: Ho Chi Minh, letter to President Johnson, 1967.
Background information: The correspondence between two heads of state, Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969) and Lyndon B. Johnson (1908–73), convey their perspectives on the war in Vietnam. This excerpt is from Ho's response to Johnson.
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The Vietnamese people deeply love independence, liberty, and peace. But in the face of the American aggression they have risen up as one man, without fearing the sacrifices and the privations. They are determined to continue their resistance until they have won real independence and liberty and true peace. Our just cause enjoys the approval and the powerful support of peoples throughout the world and of large segments of the American people.
The United States Government provoked the war of aggression in Viet-Nam. It must cease that aggression, it is the only road leading to the re-establishment of peace. . . .
[ . . . ]
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Ho Chi Minh, letter to Lyndon B. Johnson (delivered 15
February 1967), in the Department of State Bulletin 56,
no. 1450: 596–97, reproduced at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1967-vietnam-letters1.html.
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Primary source: Muhammad Ali, discussion of his decision to declare conscientious-objector status in 1967.
Background information: During the Vietnam War, boxing champion Muhammad Ali (b. 1942) was a conscientious objector. Years later, Ali discussed with his biographer his reasons for refusing induction into the U.S. armed forces in 1967.
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. . . And I made a stand all people, not just black people, should have thought about making, because it wasn't just black people being drafted. The government has a system where the rich man's son went to college, and the poor man's son went to war. Then, after the rich man's son got out of college, he did other things to keep him out of the Army until he was too old to be drafted. So what I did was for me, but it was the kind of decision everyone has to make. Freedom means being able to follow your religion, but it also means carrying the responsibility to choose between right and wrong....
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Muhammad Ali, quoted in Thomas Hauser, Muhammad Ali: His Life and Times (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 171–72.
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Primary source: Protestors at Democratic Convention, photo, 1968.
Background information: Antiwar demonstrators descended on the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in 1968. Mayor Richard Daley (1902–76) directed the police to take strong measures to control the crowd, and major confrontations between the police and the protesters ensued.
AP / Wide World Photos
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Primary source: Clark M. Clifford, "A Vietnam Reappraisal," journal article, 1969.
Background information: In this article, Clark Clifford (1906–98), secretary of defense, examines the U.S. military plan.
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When I asked for a presentation of the military plan for
attaining victory in Viet Nam, I was told that there was no
plan for victory in the historic American sense. Why not?
Because our forces were operating under three major political
restrictions: The President had forbidden the invasion of
North Viet Nam because this could trigger the mutual
assistance pact between North Viet Nam and China; the
President had forbidden the mining of the harbor at Haiphong,
the principal port through which the North received military
supplies, because a Soviet vessel might be sunk; the President had forbidden our forces to pursue the enemy into Laos and Cambodia, for to do so would spread the war, politically and geographically, with no discernible advantage. These and other restrictions . . . were wisely designed to prevent our being drawn into a larger war. We had no inclination to recommend to the President their cancellation.
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Clark M. Clifford, "A Viet Nam Reappraisal: The Personal History of One Man's View and How It Evolved," Foreign Affairs 47, no. 4 (July 1969): 601–22.
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